Growing the Grassroots or Backing Bandits? Dilemmas of Donor Support for Haiti’s (UN)Civil Society by Schuberth, Moritz
 The University of Bradford Institutional 
Repository 
http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk 
This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please refer to the 
repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from the repository home 
page for further information. 
To see the final version of this work please visit the publisher’s website. Access to the 
published online version may require a subscription. 
Link to publisher’s version: 
http://dx.doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2016.1146565  
Citation: Schuberth M (2016) Growing the Grassroots or Backing Bandits? Dilemmas of Donor 
Support for Haiti’s (UN)Civil Society. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development. 11(1): 93-98. 
Copyright statement: © 2016 Taylor & Francis. The Version of Record of this manuscript has 
been published and is available in the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development (29 Apr 2016)  
 
1
JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT, VOL. XX NO. X, 2016
© Journal of Peacebuilding & Development
ISSN 1542 - 3166 PRINT/2165 - 7440 ONLINE
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2016.1146565
GROWING THE 
GRASSROOTS OR 
BACKING BANDITS? 
DILEMMAS OF 
DONOR SUPPORT 
FOR HAITI’S (UN)
CIVIL SOCIETY
MORITZ SCHUBERTH 
Keywords: Haiti, peacebuilding, civil so-
ciety, urban violence, gangs, non-state 
armed groups, MINUSTAH, USAID, Viva 
Rio
Introduction
The vast amount of literature emerging on 
the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has hith-
erto largely ignored one important dilem-
ma donors may face when working with 
allegedly more locally accepted grassroots 
initiatives: while the latter are seen as in-
dispensable actors that play important 
roles within their community, they might 
also reveal their (un)civil criminal dimen-
sion and start to prey on the supposed 
beneciaries of peacebuilding and devel-
opment programmes. This is exactly what 
I witnessed in Haiti during six months of 
eldwork in Port-au-Prince in 2013. Based 
on semi-structured interviews and overt 
observation in Cité Soleil — often referred 
to as the most destitute slum in the Amer-
icas — my research investigates the dif-
ferent strategies that international actors 
take vis-à-vis community-based armed 
groups.1 While these groups are seen as 
legitimate civil society organisations by 
some donors, and as dangerous armed 
gangs by others, my research reveals that 
these two categorisations are not mutual-
ly exclusive.
Yet, despite or precisely because of their 
Janus-faced nature, it is imperative for 
donors dealing with these groups to act 
in concert with one another. Failure to 
achieve this could lead to situations where 
one donor bankrolls the very group that 
threatens the safety of aid workers and 
the local population alike. Indeed, after 
the ouster of President Aristide in 2004, 
NGO staff were among the victims target-
ed by urban armed groups who presented 
themselves as part of Haiti’s pro-democ-
racy movement, but were simultaneously 
working on behalf of kidnapping rings.2
The dilemmas of donor support for gangs 
posing as civil society are not limited to 
Haiti, however; similar groups are equal-
ly prevalent in other countries such as 
Kenya (Schuberth 2014). Thus, a closer 
look at the Haitian case allows lessons to 
be drawn for comparable settings.
Haiti remains by far the poorest coun-
try in the western hemisphere, as many 
a study points out (Dupuy 2007, 51).
Because of its tumultuous political his-
tory and low development indicators, 
the country has been a major recipient 
of international assistance and subject to 
no fewer than seven UN missions since 
the early 1990s. However, external actors 
are regularly criticised for exacerbating 
rather than relieving Haiti’s problems. In 
2015 a number of allegations concerning 
favouritism and squandering of resourc-
es were levelled against major donors in 
Haiti, including the American Red Cross, 
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the United States Agency for Internation-
al Development (USAID), and the Clinton 
Foundation (Glencorse & Ranjbar 2015). 
Such instances of aid mismanagement 
are all the more disastrous in contexts like 
Haiti where the government wields lim-
ited authority to regulate donors and to 
hold them accountable (Holly 2011).
International Actors and Com-
munity-based Armed Groups
For decades, residents of the most noto-
rious Haitian slums, such as Martissant, 
Bel Air and Cité Soleil, have suffered un-
der the use of non-state armed groups 
by political patrons, from the infamous 
Tonton Macoutes during the rule of the 
Duvaliers, to the attacheés under Raoul 
Cédras (Trouillot 1990). Yet, the most infa-
mous example of the instrumentalisation 
of urban armed groups occurred during 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s second presiden-
cy from 2001 to 2004 (Fleurimond 2009).
In an unsuccessful attempt to avoid his 
second ouster in 2004, Aristide tried to 
consolidate his rule by expanding his cli-
entelistic network — the baz — while arm-
ing their criminal wing — the chimères — 
as a powerful irregular force to silence the 
opposition (Dupuy 2007).
The resulting community-based armed 
groups (CBAGs) 3 are today often re-
ferred to as gangs, but observers disagree 
whether they should be framed as a po-
litico-social movement (Hallward 2007)
or as hardened criminals (v2007). This 
is due to the hybrid character of Haiti’s 
CBAGs, which act simultaneously as 
neighbourhood vigilantes, community 
leaders, criminal gangs, and political mi-
litias. Hence, as illustrated in Figure 1,
they serve political and criminal purposes 
for their sponsors, full socio-economic 
functions for their members, pose as local 
civil society organisations to attract funds 
from donors, and protect their own com-
munities as much as they prey upon them 
(Kolbe 2013; Schuberth 2015b). In the end, 
CBAGs in Haiti are the product of both 
greed and structural grievances, includ-
ing skyrocketing inequality, historical in-
justice, fragile state institutions, and the 
absence of the rule of law.
While an estimated 75% of the country’s 
population live below the poverty line, 
more than half of all Haitians live in ex-
treme poverty (UN 2011). But even in this 
unfavourable environment, neighbour-
hoods in which CBAGs are found are par-
ticularly worse off. According to a survey 
of residents in Cité Soleil, 83% report be-
ing unemployed and 82% say they would 
Figure 1:  Functions and Relations of CBAGs
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not earn ‘enough money to feed their 
households’ (Marcelin 2011, 25). Given 
these bleak living conditions, the range of 
options available to poor urban youth is 
limited and gang members can be seen as 
violent entrepreneurs who are seeking to 
improve their limited life chances.
Equally multidimensional are interna-
tional actors intervening in Haiti, as well 
as their approaches vis-à-vis CBAGs. 
While only a few programmes are explic-
itly labelled as peacebuilding — such as 
the Peacebuilding Intervention by Con-
cern Worldwide and Glencree — they 
all work towards the common aim of 
achieving the ill-dened ‘liberal peace’. 
Their means to achieve this end, how-
ever, are far from consistent. As can be 
seen in Figure 1, it is possible to discern 
three institutional logics which can each 
be attributed to different organisational 
subelds of peacebuilding (Barnett et al. 
2007, 49): (1) the coercive logic of stabilisa-
tion driving security actors as epitomised 
by military peacekeepers; (2) the coopera-
tive logic of conict resolution informing 
development and humanitarian actors — 
including Concern Worldwide and Viva 
Rio; and (3) the substitutive logic guiding 
statebuilding efforts by USAID and MI-
NUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti).4
Although MINUSTAH is conceptual-
ised as an integrated mission and vari-
ous mechanisms are in place to enhance 
cooperation and coherence between its 
military and civilian components, dif-
ferent UN agencies remain divided by 
conicting institutional logics which are 
based on entirely different worldviews. 
Yet, widely differing perspectives on 
CBAGs in Haiti can also be found with-
in one and the same organisation. For 
instance, a US subcontractor managing 
grants for a major donor with only limited 
exposure to the communities in question 
gave a rather idealistic view of CBAGs as 
respected community organisations head-
ed by notable leaders which ‘everyone in 
the community looks up to’.5 This inter-
pretation is in stark contrast to that given 
by a Haitian respondent who had actual-
ly implemented projects for the same or-
ganisation on the ground, recalling long 
and rather frightening negotiations about 
access with gang leaders at night, where 
having a loaded gun pointed to their head 
for the entire meeting was the norm rather 
than the exception.6
Different Strategies vis-à-vis 
Community-based Armed 
Groups
How have different peacebuilding and 
development actors managed — or not 
— to navigate the uncharted territories 
of Haiti’s urban slums? It is almost im-
possible for external actors to gain safe 
access to gang-ruled quartiers populaires
without direct contact with gang lead-
ers; otherwise the security and, indeed, 
life of aid workers would be put on the 
line. Hence, implementing agencies often 
nd themselves in situations in which it 
is extremely difcult to adhere to their 
own institutional standards or to those of 
their donors regarding the interaction, or 
non-interaction, with CBAGs. As a matter 
of fact, members of staff of a major inter-
national agency in Haiti and of a logistics 
supplier for MINUSTAH told me that 
their organisations have been simply pay-
ing off gang leaders in order to ensure the 
security of their staff when carrying out 
projects within the gangs’ turf.7
Even donors that have established clear 
rules on how to deal with CBAGs do not 
always live up to their own policies. A case 
in point is USAID’s Haiti Stabilization Ini-
tiative (HSI). Initially it had been reported 
that HSI ‘explicitly avoided the option to 
“negotiate” directly with so-called gangs 
and criminal actors, preferring instead to 
focus on undermining their source of le-
gitimacy’ (Muggah 2010, S452). However, 
I interviewed one former HSI staff mem-
ber who had directly negotiated with 
gang leaders, a claim backed by another 
65
70
75
80
5
10
15
20
25
30
JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT
4
former HSI employee in a subsequent in-
terview.8 To make matters worse, different 
sources conrmed that gang members 
were involved in the selection of bene-
ciaries for cash-for-work projects, which 
enabled them to favour their own family 
members, while other community mem-
bers had to pay in cash or sex for a place 
on the list.9 This strengthened gang mem-
bers to the point that Haitians started 
to complain that ‘you have to be a gang 
member to get a job as supervisor’.10 In or-
der to avoid such incidents of donor-driv-
en exploitation, donors must make sure 
that their rules are strictly adhered to by 
implementing agencies.
In contrast to HSI, the Brazilian NGO 
Viva Rio works with liaisons who ‘speak 
several languages’ — that of the gangs as 
well as that of the donors, as its director 
Rubem César Fernandes explained it to 
me.11 Perhaps in part because of the access 
that their language ability provides, Viva 
Rio has thus been able to establish itself as 
an indispensable intermediary in the Bel 
Air neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince, ne-
gotiating between international agencies 
and Haitian politicians with resources at 
their disposal on the one side, and local 
groups who can grant access and credibil-
ity on the other side. While still running 
the risk of bypassing the state and further 
strengthening certain illiberal local actors, 
relying on such gatekeepers whose be-
haviour can be at least partly monitored 
by implementing agencies is perhaps the 
least bad option; it certainly is preferable 
to paying off the next best bandit who de-
mands ‘protection fees’.
Conclusion and Recommenda-
tions
To conclude, the example of USAID’s HSI 
shows that even when donors formulate 
clear guidelines not to support criminals, 
these are bound to be ignored by imple-
menting agencies that do not properly un-
derstand the local power dynamics. Viva 
Rio’s use of liaisons, by contrast, is itself 
a precarious balancing act between the 
constructive and destructive dimensions 
of Haiti’s CBAGs. While the liaisons have 
to maintain their ties to criminal actors in 
order to full their mandate as ‘guards 
of the crossroads’ between donors and 
gangs, their behaviour is easier to control 
than that of moonlighting protection rack-
ets and their vulnerability to nancial in-
centives offered by criminal third parties 
can be reduced by a regular salary.12 Pos-
itive results in the Bel Air neighbourhood 
and many years of successful cooperation 
with the same liaisons strengthen the im-
pression that this approach is working 
better than ad hoc payments to gang lead-
ers (Moestue & Muggah 2009).
Donors should closely monitor how pro-
jects are implemented and beneciaries 
are chosen. This especially applies to 
short-term quick impact projects, which 
should ideally be supplanted by more 
sustainable long-term programmes. Sex-
ual exploitation in exchange for aid is a 
prevalent malpractice not only among 
gang members posing as civil society 
actors, but also with regard to staff of in-
ternational agencies operating in Haiti, 
as evidenced by repeated accusations of 
this nature against MINUSTAH troops 
(UN OIOS 2015). For donors to reduce the 
risks of sexual exploitation in cash-for-
work schemes, women-led NGOs such 
as MOIFECS  in Cité Soleil should be re-
sponsible for the recruitment of female 
workers and only women should be as-
signed as team leaders. Moreover, all ben-
eciaries of quick impact projects and all 
peacekeepers should receive training on 
anti-corruption and exploitation on the 
work site.13
Most importantly, it is imperative for do-
nors to ensure that everyone involved in 
implementing projects rmly sticks to 
the rule not to simply pay off bandits to 
gain access to their turf. However, this 
guideline poses a serious moral dilemma: 
while the principle of do-no-harm forbids 
the implementation of projects that risk 
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exacerbating exploitation and criminal 
violence by nancing bandits, is aban-
doning the most vulnerable parts of the 
population not a type of harm as well? 
Alternatively, donors could try to enter 
the strongholds of CBAGs with represent-
atives of what could be described as Hai-
ti’s ‘genuine’ civil society, as these actors 
often command considerable authority 
even vis-à-vis criminal groups. While it is 
difcult for external actors to distinguish 
between Haiti’s ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ soci-
ety, working only with NGOs registered 
with the Ministry of Planication could be 
a rst step in this direction.14
A quite different approach could be to 
include CBAGs in community platforms 
as representatives of one section among 
many others — such as business, edu-
cation, health, culture, and religion. By 
doing so, one could give gang leaders 
the impression that the rule they exer-
cise over their territory is respected, 
while they are actually sidelined by 
the other actors that dominate deci-
sion-making within the platforms.15 Ul-
timately any recommendation will come 
with trade-offs. Indeed, in the long run, 
only substitutive approaches — such 
as MINUSTAH’s Community Violence 
Reduction initiative and efforts to re-
form the justice system, which is seen 
by many as unjust, corrupt, and useless 
(Marcelin 2011, 22f) — can weaken the 
grip of gangs, strengthen the commu-
nity, and provide alternatives to for-
mer gang members who are willing to 
change.
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Endnotes
1 I conducted 35 interviews between June and 
December 2013 with community leaders, 
religious leaders, current and former gang 
members, local NGOs, CSOs, peace initia-
tive workers and a number of international 
agencies working in communities with gang 
presence. In order to increase the validity of 
the research, I triangulated the data by car-
rying out overt observation within informal 
settlements in Port-au-Prince between June 
and December 2013.
2 Author interview, Pétion-Ville, October 2013.
3 For a discussion of the concept of commu-
nity-based armed groups, see Schuberth 
(2015a).
4 The substitutive logic entails making CBAGs 
obsolete by replacing the different functions 
they full, for instance by reforming the 
security sector so that communities do not 
have to rely on vigilantes, or by offering al-
ternative means of income for gang mem-
bers.
5 Author interview, Pétion-Ville, September 
2013.
6 Author interview, Port-au-Prince, Novem-
ber 2013.
7 Author interviews, Haiti, November and 
December 2013.
8 Author interviews with HSI staff, Port-au-
Prince, October and November 2013.
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9 Author interviews, Haiti, September to No-
vember 2013.
10 Author interview with Haitian development 
worker, Port-au-Prince, November 2013.
11 Author interview, Pétion-Ville, November 
2013.
12 Author interview, Pétion-Ville, November 
2013.
13 Author interview with Monitoring and Eval-
uation consultant, Pétion-Ville, October 2013.
14 Author interview with Community Violence 
Reduction (CVR) section of MINUSTAH, 
Port-au-Prince, October 2013.
15 Author interviews, Haiti, September to No-
vember 2013.
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